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This paper examines the role of lumpy consumer durables and market power
in generating endogenous cycles which seem to be consistent with the facts.
When goods are durable, past consumption choices determine the current
market size which consists of consumers who have not purchased the good
previously, and who have the income to make their potential demand eﬀec-
tive. Larger past sales, ceteris paribus, thus naturally result in a smaller
current market size and income. In this manner, the seeds of a downturn are
sown in an upturn.1 Introduction
This paper examines the role of lumpy consumer durables and market power
in generating endogenous cycles. The idea we model is simple. When goods
are durable, past consumption choices determine the current market size
which consists of consumers who have not purchased the good previously.
Larger past sales, ceteris paribus, thus naturally result in a smaller current
market size. In this manner, the seeds of a downturn are sown in an upturn.
The properties of the cycles predicted by our model are consistent with
a number of empirical regularities. Among the stylized facts on business
cycles are pro-cyclical real wages, counter-cyclical prices, and durable good
consumption being more volatile than output.1 A more detailed discussion
of the empirical implications can be found in Section 3.1.
Expenditure on consumer durables is often seen as a leading indicator for
business cycles and there is considerable evidence that consumer durables
play an important role in the business cycle. For example, Olney (1999)
argues that the debt incurred for consumer durables, like cars, helped create
the Great Depression. As consumers burdened with high debt cut spending,
output fell as did factor demand, reducing pro￿ts and wages which in turn
further reduced demand and this spiralled into the Great Depression. Gordon
1Stock and Watson (1999), Cooley and Prescott (1995), and King and Rebelo (1999)
report that prices are counter-cyclical, and durable good consumption is pro-cyclical and
volatile. Barsky, Parker and Solon (1994) and Bils (1987) argue that when measured
correctly real wages are pro-cyclical.
1(1980) argues that the 1955 surge in the automobile market led a general
boom in the economy.
Our work relates to three strands of literature: indivisibilities, endogenous
business cycles, and durable good monopoly. The literature on indivisibil-
ities has dealt with the non convex production sets created by indivisibili-
ties,2 with indivisibilities in investment or R&D leading to spurts of activity,3
and with indivisibilities in labor supply raising the intertemporal elasticity
of labor supply.4 However, there has been little work on indivisibilities in
consumption.
We model a a zero-one kind of indivisibility in consumption: individu-
als buy one unit or none and cannot resell the good which lasts for only
two periods. This zero-one form is meant to re￿ect the idea that the good
must be of a minimum size.5 In practice, there are ways to make such goods
non-durable and divisible such as renting or sharing their services. However,
to the extent that it is more costly to rent than buy and because of prob-
lems sharing durables, these are not perfect substitutes.6 For simplicity, we
abstract from such alternatives.
2See Scarf (1981a,b).
3See Caplin (1985) and Shleifer (1986).
4See, for instance, Rogerson (1988).
5It is not possible to downsize endlessly as a way of reducing the extent of lumpiness:
after all, a refrigerator has to be of a minimum size to be able to hold the needed perishables
and a car can only be so small.
6At low income levels, even clothing is seen as indivisible good. One of the most
successful projects undertaken by the World Bank involved subsidizing purchases of wood
stoves. The initial cost of such stoves, around 10 to 25 dollars, prohibited their widespread
usage although they are more eﬃcient than native stoves made of mud.
2The business cycle literature provides several models in which cycles may
arise endogenously. One route is via dynamic models where, for some pa-
rameter values, the economy does not converge to a steady state, but to a
limit cycle, see for example, Diamond and Fudenberg (1989). Cycles may
also emerge through expectational eﬀects which could be related to exoge-
nous variables like ￿animal spirits￿ as in Howitt and McAfee (1992), or to
endogenous variables like prices and interest rates as in Grandmont (1985).
In these models, both cyclical as well as non-cyclical behavior is possible. A
third route for cycles to arise is via persistent exogenous shocks which get
propagated through the system as in the real business cycles literature. See
King and Rebelo (1999) for a survey of this literature.7 In contrast to the
above literature, endogenous cycles arise generically in our model. Past pric-
ing decisions leads to current demand conditions, and this results in endoge-
nous business cycles in the absence of any exogenous shocks or expectational
eﬀects.
The literature on durable goods has focused on the price path chosen
by a durable good monopolist in a partial equilibrium setting.8 By assum-
ing that consumers are in￿nitely lived and continually replenished, Conlisk,
Gerstner and Sobel (1984) argue that pricing behavior of a durable good mo-
7There has been much criticism of standard RBC models in terms of their ability to
generate cycles which match the data. Large shocks are needed to generate the needed
supply response given the fairly low intertemporal supply elasticities usually estimated,
and persistent shocks are needed to generate cycles.
8See, for example, Stokey (1979) and Bulow (1982).
3nopolist could exhibit cycles in a stationary environment due to endogenous
￿uctuations in market size.
We focus on the general rather than partial equilibrium implications. We
also move away from the standard focus on inter temporal price discrimina-
tion by ensuring that consumers always prefer buying now to later.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we develop the goods
and factor market equilibria. Section 3 looks at why endogenous cycles arise
under the assumption that ￿rms are identical. Section 4 generalizes our
results to the case where ￿rms are allowed to diﬀer in the demand conditions
they face. We also look at the role of income distribution and argue that
a more equal distribution of income could make cycles deeper. Section 5
shows that allowing forward looking behavior on the producers￿ side or credit
markets does not alter our basic results. Section 6 concludes.9
2 The Model
This paper builds on the model developed in Krishna and Yavas (2000).
The model is constructed to allow an elementary presentation. While its
components are standard, the model itself is new.
9An Appendix, available on request, includes calculations for a special case which we
use as an illustration.
42.1 Assumptions
There are two types of goods in the economy: One divisible non durable,
and for now, non storable, good produced under perfect competition, and a
continuum of durable goods, indexed by θ ∈ [0,1], each produced by a pro￿t
maximizing monopolist.10 In each period, a new set of individuals arrives in
the economy. Each individual lives for two periods. In each period of his
life he derives utility from the consumption of the non durable good and of
as p e c i ￿c type of durable good. We assume that used durables cannot be
resold.11 Thus, consumers who buy the durable good in the second period of
their lives get only one period of use.
Individuals are heterogenous in two dimensions. Individual (θ,γ)h a sa
potential demand for one unit of the durable good θ ∈ [0,1] and his pro-
ductivity is γ ∈ [0,1]. We assume that each consumer derives utility V each
period from his durable good, and that V is large. Thus, he would purchase
the durable good as soon as he could even if prices are expected to fall in
the following period. This, of course, makes indirect utility discontinuous:
consumers who are just able to buy the good are signi￿cantly better oﬀ than
those with a slightly smaller income.12
10It should be possible to generalize this to oligopoly at the cost of some complexity.
11This could occur beacuse of transactions costs or the lemons￿ problem associated with
resale.
12Although we assume below that V is very high, that agents live for only two peri-
ods, and that the non durable good has constant marginal utility, these assumptions are
made for simplicity. Diminishing marginal utility and a low V results in some of the non
durable good being purchased before the durable one making the indirect utility function
continuous, though non convex. See Ng (1965). This would aﬀect the exact form of the
5At each point of time, new consumers have an equal probability of having
a potential demand for any θ so that there is a uniform distribution over
θ. We assume throughout that γ and θ are independently distributed, and
these distributions are time invariant. This ensures that all monopolists face
the same problem if they inherit the same set of old consumers. The set
of consumers who have a demand for the durable good θ are of measure
zero relative to the set of all consumers. Thus, the pricing behavior of a
monopolist does not have any general equilibrium eﬀects.13 Durable good
￿rms are monopolists, and therefore they set prices to maximize their pro￿ts.
Thus, there tends to be too little of the durable good made.
We will use Assumption 1 below whenever concreteness is called for, and
will draw the diagrams given this assumption. However, we present the result
in a manner that shows they are more generally valid.
Assumption 1 New individuals are distributed uniformly over the unit
square in each period with unit density.
2.2 Factor Market
Labor is the only factor of production in the economy. We normalize the size
of each generation at unity. As there are two cohorts, the size of the labor
demand curve facing producers but not its nature. Similarly, allowing many generations
of agents would just increase the complexity of the model and not aﬀect the basic results.
13The assumption that there are a continuum of ￿rms and agents removes the familiar
￿Numeraire Problem￿ in the literature. It makes the choice of a numeraire irrelevant as
no individual incorporates the general equilibrium eﬀect of his actions into his decision
making.
6force at any given period is 2. Workers with productivity γ make γ units
of the non durable good and they produce αγ units of output in durables.
Workers in the durable good sector are compensated according to a piece
rate wage, w. We take the non durable good to be the numeraire. A worker
with productivity γ will have an earning of γ in the non durable good sector.
The same worker will produce αγ units of output in the durable good sector,
and earn αγw. For both goods to be produced in equilibrium the wage has to
be equal to 1
α. If the piece-rate wage in durables, w, is greater than 1
α, then
all workers prefer to work making durables. Marginal cost of production in
the durable good sector is constant at the piece rate wage, so c = 1
α.N o t e
that the allocation of labor between the two sectors will be determined by
the demand for labor in the durable good sector.
Assumption 2 α > 1.
As explained later, this assumption ensures that the durable good sector
is viable.
2.3 Goods Market
To begin with we focus on the symmetric case, and assume that consumers
cannot save or borrow so that consumers spend their entire income in each
period.14 An individual￿s income consists of two components. The ￿rst com-
ponent is labor earnings. As discussed in the previous section, this depends
14A ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n5 . 2 ,t h i sa s s u m p t i o ni sn o tc e n t r a l .
7on the productivity of the individual, with higher productivity individuals
earning more. The second component of the income is the pro￿ts h a r e .F o r
concreteness we focus on two extreme cases. These are described as Assump-
tion 3(a)a n d3 ( b)b e l o w .
Assumption 3(a) Pro￿ts accrue only to consumers with very high values
of γ.
In this case ￿rms choose not to sell only to the very rich as they can
at most charge them V and they are small in number, but to the broader
market.
Assumption 3(b) Pro￿ts are equally distributed across all individuals in
the economy.
In this case each individual is entitled to 1
2Π as his pro￿t share as the
total population (labor force and hence consumers) in the economy is 2.
Let P be the price of a durable good. Let Π(γ)d e n o t et h ep r o ￿ts h a r e
for an individual with productivity γ. Thus, an individual with productivity
γ has income of Π(γ)+γ so that he will purchase his durable good if
P ≤ Π(γ)+γ
assuming that he does not already have it. The balance of his income is
spent on the non durable good.
8The demand function facing a typical durable good ￿rm given the pro-
portion of young consumers served in the previous period, λt−1, and expected
aggregate pro￿ts of Πt is denoted by D(P,Πt,λt−1). Figures 1(a)a n d( b)d e -
pict demand under our standing assumptions and Assumption 3(a)a n d( b)
respectively.
First consider what happens if there are no old consumers, i.e., λt−1 =1 ,
and aggregate pro￿ts are zero, i.e., demand is D(P,0,1 ) . T h i si sd e p i c t e d
in Figure 1 by the line Dd which gives the proportion of young individuals
with a productivity higher than the price, P.I f p r o ￿ts exist and go only
to the most productive, who are a small part of the population, then only
their demand could be aﬀected by changes in Π. Willingness to pay equals
the lower of total earnings and V. If earnings exceed V for all these agents,
demand is unaﬀe c t e da sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1 ( a)b yVJTD .
If pro￿ts are equally distributed, changes in Π move the demand curve
vertically as Π
2 is added to each individual￿s income and his willingness to pay
for the durable good. At a price of Π
2 all individuals can aﬀord the durable
good, and as price falls below Π
2 there are no further increases in demand.
Hence we obtain a demand curve with a vertical segment as depicted in
Figure 1(b)a sEeD.
The existence of some old individuals who have not previously purchased
the durable good causes a kink in the demand curve. The kink occurs at
the point on D(P,Π,1) vertically above λt−1, that is, at F in Figure 1. The
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10demand curve intersects the horizontal axis at (2 − λt−1). At prices below
the kink, a unit reduction in the price level will result in twice the increase
in the demand relative to that above the kink. The resulting demand curve,
D(.), is given by VJTFH in Figure 1(a)a n dEFHK in Figure 1(b)a n di s
the maximum of the two curves, VJTD and IH in Figure 1(a)a n dEeD
and IHK in Figure 1(b). We denote the steeper curve where only the young
are served, by D∗(.), and the ￿atter one by ￿ D(.).
3 Symmetric Equilibrium
The endogenous variables in the system at time t consist of the pro￿ts earned
by each ￿rm, denoted by πt, the proportion of young individuals served,
denoted by λt, and the price charged by ￿rms making the durable good, Pt.
In this section we assume that the proportion of young consumers served in
period t − 1, λt−1, i st h es a m ef o ra l l￿rms. This assumption is relaxed in
Section 4.
It is easy to derive the pro￿t maximizing choice of the ￿rm for given levels
of aggregate pro￿ts, Πt, and λt−1. Since there is a unit mass of identical ￿rms
in this model, the pro￿ts of each ￿rm equal aggregate pro￿ts in the symmetric
equilibrium. Setting these equal gives the pro￿ts in symmetric equilibrium
at time t. Knowing the equilibrium level of pro￿ts then enables one to ￿nd
the remaining endogenous variables including the state variable in the next
period, λt.
11Consider the output choice of an individual ￿rm at a given level of λt−1
and Π. There are three candidates for the pro￿t maximizing output choice of
each monopolist. Firms never choose to serve the whole market as it is not
pro￿table as argued later. Thus, his optimal choice must lie either along the
￿atter part of the demand curve, or the steeper part of the demand curve.
Let π(Π,λt−1)b et h ep r o ￿ts along D(.), while π∗(Π)a n d￿ π(Π,λt−1)d e -
note the pro￿ts along D∗(.)a n d ￿ D(.) respectively.15 Demand is given by D∗(.)
for high prices and by ￿ D(.) for lower ones. An increase in λt−1 increases the
region over which D∗(.)i sr e l e v a n ta si ts h i f t s ￿ D(.) down vertically, but does
not aﬀect the level of D∗(.). Note that demand becomes more elastic, and
πP jumps up at the kink. Since πP along both D∗(.)a n d ￿ D(.)i sd o w n w a r d
sloping due to concavity of π∗ and ￿ π, the ￿rst order condition, πP =0 ,c a n
never be satis￿ed at the kink. In other words, pro￿ts are maximized either
along D∗(.), above the kink, or along ￿ D(.), below the kink, but never at the
kink.
Figure 2(a)a n d( b)d e p i c tπ∗(Π)a n d￿ π(Π,λt−1) under Assumption 3(a)
and (b) respectively.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 3(a), both π∗(Π) and ￿ π(Π,λt−1) are indepen-
dent of Π and hence weakly convex in Π. Under Assumption 3(b) both π∗(Π)
as well as ￿ π(Π,λt−1) are increasing functions of aggregate pro￿ts with slopes
15We will use the following convention from here on to simplify the notation. The
absence of P as a variable indicates that the function is a value function as P has been
maximized out.
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13less than unity, are convex in Π, and ￿ π(Π,λt−1) is steeper than π∗(Π). Given
Assumption 2, both have positive intercepts.
Proof: Let P∗(Q,Π), ￿ P(Q,Π,λt−1)a n dP(Q,Π,λt−1) denote the inverse de-
mand curves corresponding to D∗(.), ￿ D(.)a n dD(.), respectively. An
increase in Π has no eﬀect on demand under Assumption 3(a). Hence
in Figure 2(a), π∗(Π)=π∗ and ￿ π(Π,λt−1)=￿ π(λt−1) are horizontal.
For high (low) λt−1, π∗ exceeds (falls short of) ￿ π(λt−1). As λt−1 rises,
￿ π(λt−1) falls. At λt−1 = ￿ λ the two lines coincide.
Under Assumption 3(b)a ni n c r e a s ei np r o ￿ts shifts demand upward by
Π
















If there were no sales in the previous period, then sales would be at
most equal to 2. If sales were at this maximum possible level, pro￿ts
would rise one for one with aggregate pro￿ts. However, sales are less
than this maximum so that both π∗(Π)a n d￿ π(Π,λt−1)a r e￿atter than
the 450 line as depicted in Figure 2(b).16
16Note that if a ￿r ms e l l st ot h ee n t i r em a r k e tw h e na g g r e g a t ep r o ￿ts are zero, then
individual pro￿ts must be negative since price is zero and cost is positive. This results in
a negative intercept for the individual pro￿t curve and no intersection with the 450 line
in Figure 2.
14The pro￿t maxima along ￿ D and D∗ lie along rays emanating from c as
d r a w ni nF i g u r e1 . 17 Suppose that for a given level of aggregate pro￿ts,
the pro￿ts along ￿ D and D∗ are equal, so that the same iso-pro￿tc o n t o u r
is tangent to both,18 that is in Figure 2, π∗(.)a n d￿ π(.) curves intersect
at this pro￿t level. Then output along ￿ D exceeds that along D∗ so
that the slope of ￿ π(.) exceeds that of π∗(.)a tt h i sp o i n t . F r o mt h i s
it also follows that there can be at most one intersection between the
two as depicted in Figure 2 since multiple intersections would violate
this slope relation. Therefore, pro￿ts are given by ￿ π(Π,λt−1)a b o v et h e
intersection point, and by π∗(Π) below the intersection point and π(.)
is the maximum of π∗(.)a n d￿ π(.). Both π∗(.)a n d￿ π(.)a r ec o n v e xi n
Π since output rises with Π under assumption 3(b) and is unchanged
under assumption 3(a). Since the maximum of convex functions remains
convex, π(.), is convex as well.
The vertical intercept of the demand function is unity if there are no
aggregate pro￿ts. If α ≤ 1, then costs exceed this intercept so that the
optimal production level is zero and pro￿ts along both demand curves
a r en e g a t i v ea tz e r oa g g r e g a t ep r o ￿ts. In conjunction with pro￿ts being
17In the absence of the linearity ensured by Assumption 1, these rays are replaced by the
pro￿t expansion paths which would trace out the pro￿t maximizing points along D∗(.)a n d
￿ D(.) as aggregate pro￿ts rise. Individual pro￿ts are convex in aggregate pro￿ts because
when pro￿t expansion paths are upward sloping output rises with increases in aggregate
pro￿ts.
18Isopro￿t contours are rectangular hyperbolas emanating from a height c on the vertical
axis.
15￿atter than the 450 line, this means that there is no positive aggregate
pro￿t level at which the two intersect so that the durable good sector is
not viable. If α > 1, as assumed, then these intercepts are positive so
that an intersection in the positive quadrant is ensured and the durable
good sector is viable.
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium pro￿t level.
Proof: Positive intercepts, together with π∗
Π(Π) ≤ ￿ πΠ(Π,λt−1) < 1 under both
Assumption 3(a)a n d( b) ensures a unique intersection of π(Π,λt−1)
and the 450 line and hence a unique consistent level of pro￿ts denoted
by Π(λt−1). Under Assumption 3(a), pro￿t so fas i n g l e￿rm are inde-
pendent of aggregate pro￿t levels while under Assumption 3(b), they
depend on aggregate pro￿tl e v e l s .
Now we show that the equilibrium must involve cycles. As the proportion
of old consumers rises so does the pro￿t from serving them, i.e., as λt−1 falls
￿ π(Π,λt−1) shifts upward. As a result, in equilibrium, pro￿ts are maximized
along ￿ π(Π,λt−1) for λt−1 < ￿ λ and along π∗(Π) for λt−1 > ￿ λ.T h u s ,i nF i g u r e
2, equilibrium pro￿ts fall as λt−1 rises for λt−1 ≤ ￿ λ, and they are constant
at Π∗ for λt−1 > ￿ λ.A t λt−1 = ￿ λ, ￿ π(Π,λt−1)a n dπ∗(Π) intersect along the
450 line. Similarly, output falls with increases in λt−1 for λt−1 ≤ ￿ λ and is
unaﬀected by λt−1 for λt−1 > ￿ λ.
In Figure 1 this corresponds to output and pro￿ts in equilibrium being
obtained from the intersection of D∗(.) and the ray through c associated with
16D∗(.) for high values of λt−1 and from the intersection of ￿ D(.)a n dt h er a y
through c associated with ￿ D(.) for low enough λt−1. The switchover occurs
at λt−1 = ￿ λ. When λt−1 = ￿ λ, maximizing pro￿ts along ￿ D(.)a n dD∗(.)y i e l d s
t h es a m el e v e lo fp r o ￿ts. Hence the iso-pro￿t contour is tangent to both ￿ D(.)
and D∗(.).
A monopolist￿s problem can also be thought of as choosing the proportion
of the young served in the current period, λt, as a function of the young
served in the previous period, λt−1. T h i sg i v e su sar e l a t i o nb e t w e e nλt and
λt−1 w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yλt(λt−1). As usual, the proportion of young served
depends on whether the price chosen is along D∗(.)o r ￿ D(.), and λ
∗
t or ￿ λt
correspond to the value of λt(λt−1), respectively. Next we proceed to the
properties of this relationship.
Lemma 2
λt(λt−1)=λ
∗ < λt−1 forλt−1 ≥ ￿ λ





Proof: If λt−1 < ￿ λ, equilibrium pro￿ts are given by the intersection of ￿ π(λt−1,Π)
and the 450 line. Firms choose to price below the kink in Figure 1 and
to serve both the young and the old. Output is given by the inter-
section of the ￿atter ray through c and ￿ D(.). The fraction of young
17served at this price is derived by going back to D∗(.) and is denoted by
￿ λ(λt−1). Output exceeds the share of young consumers served as both
the young and old are served. Note that ￿ λ(λt−1) > λt−1 as the ￿rm will
never price near the kink. As λt−1 falls, output rises but ￿ λ falls!
When λt−1 > ￿ λ, equilibrium pro￿ts are given by the intersection of
π∗(λt−1,Π)a n dt h e4 5 0 line so that pro￿ts, output and λt are unaﬀected
by λt−1. As ￿rms choose to price above the kink in Figure 1, λ
∗ < λt−1.
Moreover, as only the young are served, output equals λt = λ
∗.
Lemma 3 ￿ λ(￿ λ) > ￿ λ > λ
∗.
P r o o f : T h i sc a nb es e e nb ys e t t i n gλt−1 in Figure 1 at ￿ λ so that ￿ λ corresponds
to ￿ λ(￿ λ). Now note that ￿ λ(￿ λ) > ￿ λ > λ
∗.
We can now depict the relationship between λt−1 and λt as in Figure 3.
When λt−1 is zero, the market size is merely doubled so that pricing is the
same as when λt−1 is unity, although output is doubled. Under Assumption
3(a)t h i sm a k e sλt(0) = λt(1) as drawn in Figure 3. Under Assumption 3(b),
λt(0) > λt(1) since the higher aggregate pro￿ts at λt−1 =0s h i f td e m a n d
up compared to when λt−1 = 1. This is the only diﬀerence between the two
cases.
Proposition 2 The economy must have ￿nite period cycles. If G(.) is uni-
form, only two period cycles are possible.























λ∗ ￿ λ ￿ λ(λ∗) λt−1
λt
Proof: Let m be the smallest horizontal diﬀerence between the ￿ λ(.)c u r v ea n d
the 450 line. Then for λt−1 < ￿ λ, λt − λt−1 is at least m. Also note that
λt−1 cannot fall below λ
∗ .T h u s ,λ can rise for at most
￿ λ−λ∗
m periods
before falling back to λ
∗.W h e nG(.) is uniform, only two period cycles
exist as ￿ λ(λ
∗) > ￿ λ so that ￿rms cycle between ￿ λ(λ
∗)a n dλ
∗ in this
case. A proof is available on request.
Figure 3 depicts this progression in a three-period cycle.
3.1 Some Empirical Implications
Among the stylized facts on business cycles are pro-cyclical real wages, counter-
cyclical prices and durable good consumption more volatile than output.
There is much evidence in the empirical literature suggesting that wages rise
with output, that is they are procyclical. Real wages, when measured appro-
19priately, tend to be pro-cyclical although some studies ￿nd that they are not
tightly tied to the business cycle. Using longitudinal data, Barsky, Parker
and Solon (1994) show that individual real wages are more pro-cyclical than
average wages which are at best marginally procyclical. This is a consequence
of marginal workers with below average wages entering the labor market in
good times which drags average wages down. Using cross sectional data they
also show that durable goods prices, as well as the prices of non durables in
concentrated industries, are signi￿cantly counter-cyclical.
Nominal wages in our model are ￿xed in terms of the numeraire good.
However, real incomes are not and the real incomes of diﬀerent groups may
move diﬀerently. We de￿ne real incomes as the income left over for the
consumption the non durable good. Thus, individuals who purchase the
good are better oﬀ as Πt
2 − Pt rises. Those who do not buy the good gain
if Πt rises. In the ￿rst period of the boom Πt − Pt r i s e sa st h i si sn e c e s s a r y
for more of the young to be served. Pro￿ts also rise as ￿rms prefer ￿ λ(λ
∗)
to λ
∗ although the latter is still available to them. Later in the upturn, λ
rises and equilibrium pro￿ts fall (as the curve ￿ π shifts down) though Πt −Pt
necessarily rises with λ. When the downturn comes, λ falls, taking Πt − Pt
with it. In addition pro￿ts fall to their minimum of Π∗. Figure 4 depicts the
path of λt,Q t, Πt, and Πt
2 − Pt. Thus, correlation between Πt
2 − Pt, the real
income of the rich, and pro￿ts need not be positive or negative, and our work
supports the idea that disaggregated data, both across groups of individuals
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as well as over periods in the cycle need to be examined.
Stock and Watson (1999) report that the cyclical component of prices is
counter-cyclical, and that this negative correlation is stable since the early
50s. There have been many explanations in the literature for the observed
counter-cyclical prices and markups, especially in durable goods and with im-
perfectly competitive markets. Stiglitz (1984) argues that this occurs because
marginal buyers have more elastic demand. Similarly, Bils (1989) argues that
in booms, consumers with low willingness to pay enter the market and this
raises demand elasticity, which causes price decreases in booms. Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986) argue that counter cyclical pricing comes from enforcing
collusion. The gains from price cutting are higher in good times so that only
lower prices can be supported in a repeated game.
In our model there are two factors that determine income, and hence
21willingness to pay: pro￿t earnings and wage income. Wage income is acyclical
while pro￿t earnings tend to rise with output. For output to rise a higher
proportion of consumers need to be able to buy the durable good. Thus,
the behavior of prices in our model depends on the distribution of pro￿ts. If
pro￿ts are distributed evenly to all consumers, then income level in a boom
will rise, and both prices and output could rise. If pro￿ts are captured by
only a small group, then prices must fall for output to rise. Thus, unless
asset ownership is widespread, the model￿s predictions accord with the facts.
Durable goods sales are widely understood to be pro-cyclical and more
volatile than output.19 Durable good consumption rises in our model during
good times and as total labor supply is ￿xed, consumption of non durables
actually shrinks in a boom. This makes sales of durables more volatile than
total output. Adding an elastic labor supply would allow non durables pro-
duction to be procyclical as well.
4 Asymmetric Equilibrium
In the previous section we assumed all ￿rms were symmetric. In this section
we allow ￿rms to inherit diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts i z e sa n ds h o wt h a ti td o e sn o t
aﬀect our results.
Proposition 3 Even if ￿rms diﬀer in terms of their inherited market size,
each ￿rm has a ￿nite period cycle and there are a ￿nite number of ￿rm types
19See, for example, Stock and Watson (1999), King and Rebelo (1999), and Cooley and
Prescott (1995).
22in steady state. Hence, aggregate cycles are of ￿nite length.
Proof: Firms, with diﬀerent market sizes will have diﬀerent π(Π,λt−1)c u r v e s
as a function of Π alone. However, for the same reasons as earlier,
these curves are increasing but ￿atter than the 450 line, have positive
intercepts and are convex. Under Assumption 3(b), each type will have
diﬀerent aggregate pro￿tl e v e l s(￿ Π(λt−1)) at which their pro￿tf u n c t i o n s
switch from being π∗(Π)t o￿ π(Π,λt−1). To derive equilibrium pro￿ts,
we need to construct the appropriate (according to the distribution of
￿rm types) convex combination of these pro￿t functions. However, this
aggregate function will have the same properties, namely, it will be in-
creasing but ￿atter than the 450 line, have a positive Y intercept and
be convex in aggregate pro￿ts. The intersection of this aggregate pro￿t
function with the 450 line gives unique aggregate pro￿ts in equilibrium.
Under Assumption 3(a), pro￿ts do not aﬀect demand so that the be-
havior of ￿rms is independent of aggregate pro￿t levels and hence of
the distribution of ￿rms. The analysis of the previous section carries
over and asymmetries of this form do not aﬀect the analysis. Firms
who served λt−1 of the young in the previous period choose to serve
￿ λ(λt−1) of the young today if λt−1 < ￿ λ, while if λt−1 > ￿ λ, they serve λ
∗
of the young. Since cycles for each ￿rm are of ￿nite length, so are the
number of diﬀerent types of ￿rms in steady state.
Under Assumption 3(b), things are more complicated. As the distri-
23bution of ￿rms changes, so does the level of equilibrium pro￿ts. For
a given distribution of ￿rms, and aggregate pro￿ts, some ￿rms will
choose to price at λ
∗(Π). Others will choose to price at diﬀerent levels
along ￿ λ(Π,λt−1). It can be veri￿ed by using Figure 1(b)t h a tt h e￿ λ(.)
and λ
∗(.) curves shift upwards with an increase in aggregate pro￿ts.
This follows from the fact that output and hence the proportion of
young served rising with aggregate pro￿ts. ￿ λ(Π) also rises with aggre-
gate pro￿ts. Recall that the slope of individual pro￿ts in Figure 2 is
related to the output chosen. Hence ￿ πΠ(Π, ￿ λ) > π∗
Π(Π). Thus to keep
￿ π(Π,￿ λ)=π∗(Π), λ needs to rise with an increase in aggregate pro￿ts.
We know that in equilibrium, pro￿ts cannot be lower than those that
obtained when all ￿rms sell only to the young or higher than those
when all ￿rms served no consumer in the previous period, λt−1 =0 ,
that is they must lie between Π∗ and ￿ Π(0) derived in the symmetric




there is a ￿ λ(Π,λt−1)
and a ￿ λ(Π). Let m0(Π) > 0 be the smallest horizontal distance between
￿ λ(Π,λt−1)a n dt h e4 5 0 line, and let m0 > 0 denote the smallest value of




. Thus, a ￿rm which inherits
a λt−1 below ￿ λ(.)m u s ti n c r e a s ei t sλ by at least m0. ￿ λ(￿ Π(0)) is the
highest value of ￿ λ(.) that is possible and λ
∗ (Π∗) is the lowest value
that λ can take. Hence a ￿rm can take at most
￿ λ(￿ Π(0))−λ∗(Π∗)
m0 periods
to cross the switchover point. Hence, each ￿r mc a nh a v ea tm o s ta
24cycle of length
￿ λ(￿ Π(0))−λ∗(Π∗)
m0 . As a consequence, there can be at most
￿ λ(￿ Π(0))−λ∗(Π∗)
m0 diﬀerent kinds of ￿rms since when a ￿rm switches over, it
joins all other ￿rms which have switched with it.
4.1 No Aggregate Cycles
Although we have shown that individual ￿rms must have cycles, there need
not be aggregate cycles, although this is a non-generic case. Suppose that
half the ￿rms inherit λ
∗(Π0) while the other half inherit ￿ λ(λ
∗,Π0)a n da g -
gregate pro￿ts, Π0, are such that the pro￿t function derived by giving equal
weight to these two types of ￿rms intersects the 450 line at Π0 so that this
is an equilibrium. Let ￿ λ(λ
∗,Π0) > ￿ λ(Π0) as is the case with the uniform
distribution. Given this level of pro￿ts, ￿rms which inherit λ
∗(Π0)c h o o s et o
serve both the young and old and serve ￿ λ(λ
∗,Π0) of their young, while ￿rms
which inherit ￿ λ(λ
∗,Π0) choose to serve only their young, and λ
∗(Π0)o ft h e m .
In each period, ￿rms switch types so that there are no aggregate cycles.20
Similarly, there are no aggregate cycles if there are T types of ￿rms, each
with a proportion 1/T, and with T period cycles. In this case, ￿rms switch
types but the distribution of types is unchanged over time.
4.2 Aggregate Cycles
When aggregate market size varies over time, the economy has aggregate
cycles. The depth of the cycle depends on the asymmetry between ￿rms.
20This argument is valid under both Assumption 3(a)a n d3 ( b).




































Figure 5 depicts a two period aggregate cycle under Assumption 3(b). In
this case there are at most two types of ￿r m s .T h o s et y p e sw h i c hh a v eal a r g e
market in the current period and those who have a smaller market. If there
are a greater proportion of the ￿rst type, aggregate pro￿ts are higher than
when the reverse is true. Call the equilibrium pro￿ts in the ￿rst instance ΠH
a n di nt h es e c o n dΠL. Firms of the ￿rst type whose good periods are syn-





L )w h i l e￿rms of the second type whose good periods, are





H ). Note that an increase in aggregate pro￿ts shifts ￿ λ(.,Π),
26λ
∗(Π)a n d￿ λ(Π)u p w a r d s . This two period cycle will be the case if
￿ λ(λ
∗(ΠL),ΠH) > ￿ λ(λ
∗(ΠH),ΠL) > ￿ λ(ΠH) > ￿ λ(ΠL) > λ
∗(ΠH) > λ
∗(ΠL).
In this event, the cycle of type 1 ￿r m se n c l o s e st h ec y c l eo ft y p e2￿rms.
Thus, their cycle is deeper than that of type 2 ￿r m sa sd e p i c t e d .
Under Assumption 3(a), there are no aggregate pro￿te ﬀects so that the
￿ λ(λ)a n dλ
∗ curves are independent of the aggregate pro￿t level in equilib-
rium. In this case, all ￿rms follow the same path. Yet, there is an aggregate
cycle if the proportion of ￿rms are not equal. There can be aggregate cycles
of more than two period length in steady state if ￿ λ(λ
∗) < ￿ λ. However, cycles
remain of ￿nite length since there are a ￿nite number of type of ￿rms, each
with a cycle of ￿nite length.
4.3 Income Distribution and the Cycle Depth
Under Assumption 3(a), distribution of ownership shares and hence pro￿ts
is very unequal while it is equal under Assumption 3(b). A comparison of
the outcomes under these two assumptions gives some insight into how the
distribution of assets might aﬀect the depth of cycles. Consider a two period
aggregate cycle case. Let σ ≥ 1/2 denote the proportion of ￿rms that are
in the majority. As this majority rises, pro￿ts in the good state (H)a n d
bad state (L) diverge, i.e., cycles deepen. When σ equals unity, all ￿rms
are alike so that aggregate pro￿ts in the good state are as high as they will



















get and in the bad state are as low as they will get.21 When σ equals one
half, then there are no aggregate cycles. Figure 6 depicts this relationship
under assumptions 3(a)a n d3 ( b) respectively. When pro￿ts are distributed
evenly, the level of pro￿ts in both states is higher than when pro￿ts accrue
only to the most productive (Assumption 3(b)v e r s u s3 ( a)).The diﬀerence
in the good and bad states is also greater so that the two curves are more
spread out as drawn. This suggests that an economy with a more widespread
ownership of productive assets would also be faced with deeper cycles!22
21In the bad period ΠL(1) = Π∗, a n di nt h eg o o dp e r i o dΠH(1) = ￿ Π(λ
∗).
22More generally, when more assets are held by the more productive, a boom will raise
pro￿ts and make the demand curve more inelastic as well as shifting it upwards. By
assuming an equal distribution of assets, we have eliminated the ￿rst eﬀect which would
tend to reduce output and raise price in a boom.
285R o b u s t n e s s
In this section we show that relaxing a number of assumptions made so far,
including that of myopic behavior on the part of ￿rms, and no credit markets
will not change our main results.
5.1 Forward Looking Behavior
We have assumed so far that ￿rms maximize their current period pro￿ts.
They do not take the eﬀects of their current choice on future pro￿ts into
account. Here we look at the eﬀect of such forward looking behavior on the
part of ￿rms and argue that such behavior tends to deepen the cycle, not
eliminate it. 23
Think of a ￿rm as choosing not output or price, but equivalently the
proportion of young consumers it serves, λt. By reducing λt today, a ￿rm
can increase its market size tomorrow. We need to add the value of future
which depends only on its choice of λt, denoted by Z(λt), to the objective
function of a ￿rm. Thus, a forward looking ￿rm maximizes
π(λt,λt−1,Πt)+Z(λt)
and chooses λt so that
πλt(λt,λt−1,Πt)+Zλt(λt)=0 .
23Nor for that matter, would the possibility of carrying inventories aﬀect our results as
production costs are constant so that there is no gain from carrying inventories, and if
there are any costs of doing so, there will be no incentives to carry inventories.
29On the other hand, a myopic ￿rm maximizes π(λt,λt−1,Πt), and chooses λt
so that
πλt(λt,λt−1,Πt)=0 .
Since serving a greater proportion of the young today reduces the ￿rm￿s
demand and hence pro￿ts tomorrow, Zλt(λt) ≤ 0. Hence, a forward looking
￿rm will, if anything, want to hoard customers.24
Consider the symmetric ￿rm case with two period aggregate cycles. How
would a forward looking ￿rm￿s choices diﬀer from those of a myopic one? In
good times, when pro￿ts are high, a ￿rm has no incentive to reduce λt since it
will not serve the customers it has hoarded in the next, low aggregate pro￿t
period, anyway. In other words, in good times Zλt(λt)=0 , and a forward
looking ￿rm chooses the same level of output as a myopic ￿rm. However, in
bad times, since it will serve its hoarded customers in the next period, i.e.,
since Zλt(λt) < 0, a ￿rm will have an incentive to reduce λt below that of a
myopic ￿rm.25 But this will just deepen the cycle!26
24Although pro￿ts are not single peaked there is an interior maximum so that the ￿rst
order conditions hold.at every local maximum.
25Note that pro￿ts fall as λt rises up till ￿ λ, a n dt h e na r e￿at. Due to this, pro￿ts are
weakly decreasing and convex in λt. As a result of this convexity in pro￿ts, a ￿rm tends
to like variability in λt.
26It is also worth pointing out that allowing for some competition between ￿rms will
weaken the incentive to hoard customers as hoarded customers are like a public good,
available to all competitors of the ￿rm as well as itself.
305.2 Credit Markets
So far we have assumed that there are no credit markets, or for that matter,
even savings possibilities, available to the consumer. We now argue that our
results are not dependent on this assumption. Credit markets reduce the
distortion caused by indivisibilities by increasing the set of consumers who
can aﬀord to buy the good. However, cycles remain.
We assume that credit markets are perfect and all those who can repay
their loans have access to credit. We show that while credit markets improve
welfare by expanding the range of consumers who can aﬀord the durable, they
do not eliminate cycles. For simplicity, we only use Assumption 3(a)i nt h i s
section. The results can be generalized at the cost of some complexity. We
will proceed as follows. First we will outline how the availability of credit
aﬀects eﬀective demand. From this we derive the demand and supply of
credit and show that when the rate of time preference, ρ, is zero, the analysis
looks no diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a ta b o v e .
The availability of credit changes the eﬀective demand faced by the mo-
nopolist. When the price is P0, and only the young are served, individuals
with productivity exceeding P0 c a nb u yt h eg o o de v e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fc r e d i t
markets. However, credit allows more individuals to aﬀord the good, ceteris
paribus. Without credit markets, the demand by the young was given by the
line AB in Figure 7. With credit markets, an individual can aﬀord the good
if the price is less than the present discounted value of his income, P ≤ 2+r
1+rγ.
















































































32Thus, demand by the young consumers shifts up to AC where the point C
corresponds to the coordinates (0, 2+r
1+r).
Credit markets also aﬀect demand by the old consumers. Individuals
who lent money when they were young have an income equal to (2+r)t i m e s
their productivity in their second period. This relation is represented by the
line AD where D corresponds to the coordinates (0,2+r)i nF i g u r e7 . This
line lies above AC for r>0. Suppose the price in the last period was P0.
Individuals to the right of H were unable to buy the good in the last period
and their willingness to pay today lies along the line NA.Thus their demand
is given by NA, taking H as the origin. If price exceeds L, then none of
the old can aﬀord to buy the good. Only for prices below L can the old
participate. Thus, total demand from the young and the old in period 1 is
the horizontal sum of the demand of the young and old, and this results in
the kinked demand curve, CKP.
The equilibrium interest rate, r, is such that demand for credit is equal
to the supply of credit. What are the demand for and supply of credit at
given levels of prices? First note that only the young participate in the credit
market. The old earn revenue from repayments of past loans but neither lend
nor borrow. Now, suppose that only the young are served in period 0 while
b o t hy o u n ga n do l da r es e r v e di np e r i o d1 . Let P0 be the price in period 0.
Then, individuals in MH demand credit as they can aﬀord the good on the
basis of their net worth but not based on their current income. Their demand
33f o rc r e d i ti st h ed i ﬀerence between P0 and their current income. Hence credit
demand is given by the area EFG.A s r rises AC becomes ￿atter and at
given prices demand for credit falls. Hence we have the usual downward
sloping demand for credit.
The supply of credit comes from two sources. The ￿rst source is individ-
uals who cannot aﬀord the good today, even if they borrow, but who could
aﬀord it tomorrow if they save today and lend. If the price in period 1 is
given by P1, this consists of the individuals in the region HI in Figure 7
whose supply of credit is the area HGJI. The second source is individuals
whose income exceeds the price of the durable, that is, those in region OM
who supply credit equal to the area P0BE + Π
2 (since pro￿ts are captured
by some of these agents), as well as individuals whose lifetime income (in
present value terms) is not high enough to aﬀord the durable good even if
they postpone consumption to the second period. This consists of individu-
als in the region IA who supply credit equal to area IJA.T h e￿rst source
is willing to lend (but only what is needed to buy the durable in the next
period) even if the interest rate, r, is less than the rate of time preference, ρ,
as lending today enables them to transfer part of their income to tomorrow
and thus aﬀord to buy the durable in their second period. On the other
hand, the second source is willing to lend only if r ≥ ρ because their motive
in lending is to consume more of the non durable good later on.
If r<ρ, the only source of credit is the ￿rst one and as r rises AD
34swings out and AC swings in moving I to the right and H to the left thereby
increasing credit supplied. If r>ρ, all agents to the right of H and left
of M supply credit. Since an increase in r moves H to the left and leaves
M unchanged, credit supplied rises as r rises. At r = ρ, there is a ￿at
part for credit supply corresponding to individuals in OM and IA becoming
just willing to supply credit here. This ￿at segment makes r = ρ a likely
candidate to be the equilibrium interest rate. Suppose ρ =0 . In this event,
it can be veri￿ed that r = ρ = 0 is the unique equilibrium interest rate under
assumption 3(a) and a uniform distribution of γ.27
This case when r = ρ = 0 is illustrated in Figure 8. Note that here the
curves AC and AD are identical. If the monopolist serves only the young he
maximizes pro￿ts choosing E along AD. In the subsequent period, demand
is given by DEF as the kink occurs at E (the last period￿s price) as in
the original model without credit. The monopolist chooses the point G to
maximize pro￿ts and prices at P1 <P 0. Of course, this results in a kink in the
subsequent period at H,s ot h a td e m a n di sg i v e nb yDHI. The monopolist
now ￿nds it optimal to price at E and so the cycle develops. Note that
the only diﬀerence between this analysis and that without credit is that AD
plays the role of AB earlier. For the same reasons as before, we must have
cycles. For small perturbations in r and ρ, similar arguments work.
27In the uniform distribution case it is easy to show that if ρ =0 , there are only two
period cycles and r = 0 is the only equilibrium in both periods of the cycle. The proof is
in the Appendix.




































































































Our work in this paper suggests an important role for income distribution,
and for the distribution of asset ownership on the characteristics of cycles
that economy will experience. It also provides a way of looking at the eﬀects
of inside as done above, and outside credit on the economy. In addition, the
simple general equilibrium structure developed provides a way to study a
number of issues in trade and development which are the subject of ongoing
research.
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40A Appendix
A.1 Calculations for the Uniform Distribution Case
In this Appendix we show that cycles are two period ones when the pro-
ductivity parameter is distributed uniformly, γ ￿U[0,1], even if ￿rms are
not symmetric. Recall that when ￿rms were symmetric, then two period
cycles were ensured if ￿ λ(λ
∗) > ￿ λ as shown in Section 3. When ￿rms are
not symmetric, then the distribution of young served across ￿rms aﬀects the
equilibrium level of pro￿ts as argued in Section 4. As a result, correspond-
ing to any given distribution and hence aggregate pro￿t level in equilibrium,
there correspond functions ￿ λ(λ
∗,Π), λ
∗(Π)a n d￿ λ(Π) each of which has been
s h o w nt ob ei n c r e a s i n gi nΠ as depicted in Figure 5.
As u ﬃcient condition for each ￿rm to have only two period cycles is
thus that for each level of aggregate pro￿ts, and each viable value of λ
∗,
￿ λ(λ
∗,Π) > ￿ λ(Π). Recall that ￿ λ(λ,Π)i n c r e a s e sa sλ or Π rise and ￿ λ(Π)r i s e s
with Π. Thus, if the above holds at the lowest feasible value of λ
∗ and Π
on the left hand side and the highest possible value of Π on the right hand
side then it must hold throughout. The lowest feasible value of λ is the value
of λ
∗ for the lowest feasible value of aggregate pro￿ts. The lowest level of
equilibrium pro￿ts occurs when none of the old are served by anyone. This
results in aggregate pro￿ts of Π∗. When all ￿rms inherit the largest feasible
market, i.e., the share of young served in the last period takes its lowest
41value, the highest feasible value of Π = ￿ Π(λ




∗) > ￿ λ(￿ Π(λ
∗(Π
∗)) (1)
is suﬃcent to ensure that there are only two period cycles, even with asym-
metric ￿rms.
We ￿rst ￿nd λ
∗ and Π∗. The pro￿t level associated with the demand
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Output is also equal to λ











Of course, Π∗, can be solved for by setting ￿rm pro￿ts equal to aggregate










Now to ￿nd ￿ Π(λ
∗(Π∗)). When all ￿rms inherit λ
∗(Π∗), demand will have
ak i n ka tq = λ
∗(Π∗). The total number of potential consumers is 2−λ
∗(Π∗)
42of which 1−λ
∗(Π∗) are old consumers. Thus, the ￿atter part of the demand
function can be expressed as
￿ D =2− λ
∗(Π




The pro￿t level associated with the demand curve ￿ D, ￿ π(Π,λ
∗(Π∗)), is the
value function for the problem:
Max
P
(P − c)(2 − λ
∗(Π
∗) − 2P + Π).























when we substitute for λ
∗(Π∗)=q∗ = 1
2(1 + Π∗




∗)) = ( ￿ P(λ
∗(Π
∗),Π) − c)(2 − λ
∗(Π
∗) − 2 ￿ P(λ
∗(Π
∗),Π)+Π)






∗ − 6c +4 Π)
2 (5)
using (4) to substitute for 2 − λ
∗(Π∗)+Π =4￿ P(λ
∗(Π∗),Π) − 2c.
Demand by the young is represented by the steeper part of the demand
curve, D∗(.). The proportion of the young served, ￿ λ(λ
∗(Π∗)) can be found
by going back to D∗(.)a t ￿ P(λ
































We now have the left hand side of (1) and turn to the right hand side.
￿ Π(λ
∗(Π∗)) denotes the equilibrium level of aggregate pro￿ts when all ￿rms
inherit λ
∗(Π∗). Using (5) and setting individual pro￿ts to equal aggregate














Now to ￿nd ￿ λ(￿ Π(λ
∗(Π∗))). If aggregate pro￿ts are Π, then ￿ λ(Π) can be found
implicitly by setting
￿ π(Π, ￿ λ(Π)) = π
∗(Π).
Substituting for the two sides in the above using (5) and (2) gives
























Evaluating ￿ λ(Π)a t￿ Π(λ














Solving (3) and (8) gives the highest and lowest aggregate pro￿t levels to
44be28
Π





∗)) = 4 + 2c −
√
2+2 c − 2
q
4+4 c − 2
√
2+2 c
Substituting for Π∗ and ￿ Π(λ











































4+4 c − 2
√
2+2 c)(11)
Plotting the diﬀerence between the two using (10) and (11) and MAPLE
shows that ￿ λ(λ
∗(Π∗),Π∗) > ￿ λ(￿ Π(λ
∗(Π∗))) for all c ∈ [0,1] which concludes
the proof.
A.2 Equilibrium When r = ρ =0
We show that if ρ =0 , then r = 0 is the only equilibrium in both periods
of the cycle when the productivity parameter is uniformly distributed in the
unit interval.
28While there are two roots to the equations we choose the negative root as the positive
ones results in infeasibly large output levels.
45Following the notation in Section 5.2w ec a l lt h ep e r i o dw h e r e￿rms serve
only their young as period 0, and therefore P0 denotes the high price. Now,
we ￿rst ￿nd this price, P0, and calculate the demand for credit and supply of
credit at P0 if r = ρ =0 . We ￿nd that supply exceeds credit in such a case.
Even though potential supply exceeds demand at r = 0, the entire supply
comes from individuals who are indiﬀerent between supplying credit and not,
and supply of credit falls to zero at a negative interest rate. Therefore r =0
is the equilibrium interest rate. Next we show that in the following period,
period 1,r= 0 remains the equilibrium interest rate.
A.2.1 Period 0:High Price Period



























Note that price exceeds 1 so that given Assumption 3(a)o n l yt h ei n -
￿nitesimally few who appropriate the pro￿ts can aﬀord the good on their

































































































































47current income. All others need credit to purchase the durable. Only those
with a lifetime income in excess of the price, that is, individuals whose pro-
ductivity and current income is greater than P0
2 , will get the credit equal to
the diﬀerence between their current income and the price. Thus, the demand
for credit is given by the area P0EGB in Figure 9.
Supply of credit comes from two sources: half of the pro￿ts (share of
the young), and individuals whose current income is less than P0
2 . The pro￿t
share of the young is 1
2(P0−c)q0, while the supply of credit by poor individuals
is given by the area of the triangle Gλ0A. Thus, total supply of credit will be
the area Gλ0A + 1
2(P0 − c)q0. Note that along the line BA, P =1− q, and
along the line DA, P =2− 2q.
The demand for credit is
P0EGB =( P0 − 1)λ0 +
1
2
















(P0 − c)q0 =
1
2


















Note that the ￿rst term, 1
8 + 1
8c + 1




32c2, and the second term is strictly positive. Therefore, r =0i s
the equilibrium interest rate in period 0.
48A.2.2 Period 1:Low Price Period
In the following period, the demand curve is given by DEF, and the mo-
nopolist chooses a lower price and serves a larger proportion of its young
consumers. The ￿atter part of the demand curve can be expressed as












































Note that P1 exceeds 1 if c>2
5, and it is less than 1 otherwise. Credit
demand comes from the young who cannot aﬀo r dt h eg o o db a s e do nt h e i r
current income.
Figure 9(a) depicts the case for c<2/5, i.e., P1 < 1. Then, individuals

































49When P1 < 1 supply of credit comes from three sources: Supply from the
rich, BP1I, supply from the poor, Kλ1A, and the pro￿t share of the young,
1
2(P1 − c)q1 :
BP1I + Kλ1A +
1
2



























positive at all c ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, r = 0 is the equilibrium interest rate.
What if c>2/5? In this case, as in period 0, no individual can aﬀord the
good without borrowing. Figure 9(b) depicts the case for c>2/5. Demand
for credit is given by the area P1JKB:
P1JKB =( P1 − 1)λ1 +
1
2







































Now, supply comes from only two sources, the poor and pro￿ts going to
the young as no one can aﬀord the good on their current income alone:
Kλ1A + 1













































50Even without supply coming from pro￿ts, supply exceeds demand for all c,
therefore r = 0 is still an equilibrium.
A.2.3 Cycles With Credit Markets
Finally we show that this economy has a two-period cycle with credit markets.
The ￿atter part of the demand curve in period 2 is

















































by serving on the steeper part of the demand curve. Therefore, this economy
has two-period cycles.
51